Market Access in the Age of Transparency, Part 1: How PBM Formulary Exclusions and Private-Label Drugs Affect Manufacturers

Adam C. Farkas and Jesse C. Dresser

Article

Part 1 of the Series: Market Access in the Age of Transparency

For a pharmaceutical manufacturer, few events are more commercially consequential than a formulary exclusion. A product omitted from a health plan’s formulary, or relegated to a nonpreferred tier behind prior authorization, step therapy, or high patient cost sharing, is functionally unavailable to a large share of patients regardless of its FDA-approved labeling or clinical profile. That reality gives pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) significant leverage. CVS Caremark, Express Scripts, and OptumRx together administer roughly 80% of prescription claims in the United States, giving their formulary decisions substantial influence over which therapies reach patients and how much manufacturers must pay to secure access.

This article, the first in a six-part series, examines how vertically integrated PBMs may use formulary design and their own private-label drug businesses to direct utilization toward affiliated products. It also explores the legal frameworks that govern those decisions, and the legal and commercial tools manufacturers can use to challenge exclusions that lack clinical or economic justification.

Vertical Integration and the Rise of PBM Private-Label Drugs

Formulary exclusion has long been a negotiating tool: a PBM threatens removal, a manufacturer offers a larger rebate, and preferred access is restored. That dynamic changes when a PBM also owns a competing product. Each of the three dominant PBMs now sits inside an enterprise that owns insurers, specialty pharmacies, rebate aggregators, and  private-label drug ventures.

CVS Health operates Cordavis, Optum operates Nuvaila, and Cigna’s Evernorth, which owns Express Scripts, operates Quallent Pharmaceuticals. All three have used these affiliates to market biosimilars of high-volume biologics, most visibly in the Humira and Stelara categories, where 2025 and 2026 formularies have favored private-label or co-branded products over the reference biologic and most independent biosimilars.

The concern is that the enterprise deciding formulary placement also profits from the product placed there and potentially from the affiliated pharmacy that dispenses it. A manufacturer competing against a PBM’s own affiliate is negotiating with a counterparty that has a direct financial stake in the outcome and controls the forum in which that outcome is decided. The conflict can be particularly consequential in biologics, where switching patients back after a formulary-driven transition may present clinical and practical challenges. This conflict does not make an exclusion unlawful by itself, but it undermines any presumption that the decision reflects neutral judgment about cost or clinical value, and it supplies the factual foundation for the legal theories discussed below.

The Enforcement Record: FTC Actions and State PBM Litigation

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has built a substantial public record of these PBM pricing and reimbursement practices. Its January 2025 interim staff report found that the three largest PBMs marked up specialty generic drugs dispensed through affiliated pharmacies by hundreds and sometimes thousands of percent, generating more than $7.3 billion in revenue above estimated acquisition cost between 2017 and 2022. The FTC’s September 2024 administrative action against all three PBMs, alleging that rebate-driven formulary practices inflated insulin prices, has since produced settlements. Express Scripts agreed on February 4, 2026 to a consent order prohibiting it from preferencing higher-list-price products over lower-cost equivalents, and Caremark reached a substantially similar settlement on July 14, 2026. OptumRx has executed a proposed consent agreement whose terms remain non-public pending Commission acceptance.

These orders do not declare private-label self-preferencing unlawful, but they establish, as a matter of record accepted by two of the three dominant PBMs, that a standard commercial formulary may not disfavor a lower-net-cost product to protect the PBM’s own economics. That gives manufacturers potential framework for testing exclusion decisions. Because violations of a final FTC order can trigger civil penalties under 15 U.S.C. § 45(l), a manufacturer that documents conduct inconsistent with an order may have grounds to bring it to the Commission’s attention, even though the manufacturer cannot enforce the order directly.

State attorneys general are pressing the issue more directly. Rhode Island alleges that CVS Caremark and Express Scripts “systematically excluded lower priced biosimilar products until they began making their own lower priced biosimilar products from which they could profit,” and in March 2026, a federal court denied the PBMs’ motion to dismiss those claims, which arise under the state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act. State v. CaremarkPCS Health, LLC, No. 25-cv-306-MRD-PAS (D.R.I. Mar. 26, 2026). Michigan’s pending antitrust complaint similarly names Cordavis, Quallent, and Nuvaila and alleges that vertically integrated PBMs are financially incentivized to steer patients to affiliated businesses, although it applies that theory to dispensing rather than formulary placement. These allegations remain unproven, but they demonstrate growing regulatory scrutiny of PBM self-preferencing and the potential significance of well-documented evidence from manufacturers.

The Legal Framework for Challenging PBM Formulary Exclusions

No federal statute prohibits a PBM from excluding a drug from a commercial formulary. Formulary decisions are instead shaped by overlapping regimes that vary by type of coverage. Identifying which regime governs a given book of business is the first step in selecting the appropriate legal or regulatory strategy.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA).

For individual and small-group plans, the ACA’s essential health benefit regulations require coverage of at least the greater of one drug per United States Pharmacopeia category and class or the number covered by the state benchmark plan, review by a qualified pharmacy and therapeutics committee, and an exceptions process with decisions within 72 hours (24 hours for exigent cases) followed by independent external review. 45 C.F.R. § 156.122. The regulations also prohibit benefit designs that discriminate based on health conditions, 45 C.F.R. § 156.125, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has warned that placing most or all drugs for a condition on the highest cost-sharing tiers can be discriminatory. Manufacturers cannot sue under these provisions, but they can use them to support patient exceptions and to ground complaints to state insurance regulators or CMS.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

Most commercially insured Americans are covered by employer plans governed by ERISA. The statute shapes formulary disputes in two important ways. First, ERISA preemption limits the reach of state formulary and step therapy laws over self-funded plans. The Supreme Court narrowed that preemption for PBM cost regulation in Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, 592 U.S. 80 (2020), but laws that dictate benefit design remain vulnerable. Second, ERISA’s fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty, reinforced by the Department of Labor’s proposed PBM compensation disclosure rule, give plan sponsors a reason to question why their PBM excluded a lower-net-cost drug in favor of a costlier affiliated product. Participants in self-funded plans also retain claims appeal and independent external review rights under federal regulations.

Medicare Part D and the Inflation Reduction Act.

Part D sponsors must generally cover at least two drugs per category and class and substantially all drugs in the six protected classes, and CMS reviews formularies for designs that discourage enrollment. 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b). The Inflation Reduction Act’s benefit redesign, however, shifted significantly more catastrophic-phase liability onto plans, increasing their incentive to restrict high-cost specialty drugs. The Act also requires Part D plans to include drugs selected for Medicare price negotiation on their formularies beginning in 2026, and CMS has said it will monitor whether plans disadvantage those drugs through tiering or utilization management.

Antitrust and state law.

Antitrust law may provide manufacturers with a direct avenue for challenging exclusionary formulary practices. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act address unreasonable restraints, monopolization, and exclusive dealing, and the Clayton Act authorizes treble damages and injunctive relief. In Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494 (E.D. Pa. 2018), the court allowed a biosimilar manufacturer’s claims that exclusionary payer contracts blocked biosimilar coverage to proceed. These cases require proof of market definition and substantial foreclosure and are expensive to litigate, but their availability shapes negotiations. State law adds further tools, including step therapy reform statutes in most states, limits on mid-year formulary changes, PBM licensure regimes that authorize regulator complaints, and unfair trade practices statutes, though most of these reach only fully insured plans.

New federal PBM transparency requirements may provide additional tools for manufacturers and plan sponsors. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2026 includes provisions requiring PBMs to give group health plans semiannual reports that, for any drug with more than $10,000 in plan spending, list therapeutic alternatives and the rationale for the drug’s formulary placement. The legislation also mandates full pass-through of manufacturer rebates to ERISA plans. Most provisions phase in during 2028 and 2029, but once in effect, these requirements may give plan sponsors greater visibility into PBM formulary decisions and drug costs, potentially providing manufacturers with important leverage in their negotiations with PBMs.

What Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Should Do to Protect Market Access

Manufacturers that seek to protect market access should treat access as a documented, ongoing negotiation backed by legal leverage rather than a single annual pricing event. The following strategies can be deployed individually or together, depending on the product and payor mix.

1. Negotiate formulary protections into rebate agreements.

Seek objective, disclosed placement criteria; a commitment not to disadvantage the product relative to a higher-net-cost affiliated product, consistent with the transparency and competition concerns reflected in FTC enforcement actions; advance notice and a cure period before any exclusion or negative tier change; disclosure of PBM ownership interests in competing products; and audit rights to test the PBM’s stated net-cost rationale. These terms should be structured within the Anti-Kickback Statute’s discount safe harbor and reviewed for Medicaid Best Price implications.

2. Build the record before the formulary cycle closes.

Submit a written value dossier covering net price, total cost of treatment, clinical outcomes, supply reliability, and, for biosimilars, interchangeability and switching data. Because ACA and Part D rules require committees to weigh scientific evidence, a documented submission creates a benchmark against which the decision can later be challenged.

3. Support patient exceptions and appeals.

Compliant hub and reimbursement support programs can educate prescribers on ACA, Part D, ERISA, and state step therapy exception processes and supply medical necessity templates. Aggregated exception approval data can also show that a restriction lacks clinical justification.

4. File targeted regulatory complaints and engage plan sponsors.

Raise fully insured plan issues with state insurance departments, Part D issues with CMS, and evidence of conduct inconsistent with an FTC order or of deceptive steering with the FTC and state attorneys general. At the same time, present credible cost data to employers and their consultants, whose ERISA fiduciary obligations give them reason to demand exceptions or renegotiate PBM terms.

5. Preserve the record for litigation.

Maintain formulary histories, affiliate ownership information, rebate correspondence, exclusion notices, and the PBM’s stated rationale for each decision. Where a decision cannot be reconciled with the PBM’s represented economics, that record may support potential breach of contract, unfair trade practices, tortious interference, and antitrust claims.

Looking Ahead

In Part 2 of this article series, we will examine what happens after a product secures formulary coverage but before it reaches the patient. Prior authorization, step therapy, quantity limits, and site-of-care requirements can turn nominal coverage into a significant barrier to access, particularly when the entity imposing those controls also profits from where and how the drug is dispensed. Part 2 will also explore emerging federal prior authorization requirements and state gold-carding, step therapy override, and continuity-of-care laws, and the practical strategies manufacturers may use to help ensure that a covered product is also an accessible one.

How Frier Levitt Can Help

Formulary exclusions now sit at the intersection of contract law, insurance regulation, ERISA, Medicare requirements, and antitrust law. Frier Levitt advises pharmaceutical manufacturers on PBM contracting, formulary and biosimilar strategy, patient support compliance, regulatory complaints, and disputes arising from exclusion and self-preferencing. Contact Frier Levitt to discuss strategies for protecting product access, evaluating PBM practices, and navigating evolving transparency and enforcement requirements.